Rule 10b-5: Scope of Liability Extended as Former Outsiders Become Market Insiders: \u3ci\u3eUnited States v. Chiarella\u3c/i\u3e, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), \u3ci\u3ecert. granted\u3c/i\u3e, 47 U.S.L.W. (U.S. May 15, 1979) (No. 78-1202) by Hoffert, John R.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 3 Article 10
1979
Rule 10b-5: Scope of Liability Extended as Former
Outsiders Become Market Insiders: United States v.
Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted,
47 U.S.L.W. (U.S. May 15, 1979) (No. 78-1202)
John R. Hoffert
University of Nebraska College of Law, john.hoffert@nebraska.gov
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
John R. Hoffert, Rule 10b-5: Scope of Liability Extended as Former Outsiders Become Market Insiders: United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d
1358 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. (U.S. May 15, 1979) (No. 78-1202), 58 Neb. L. Rev. 866 (1979)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol58/iss3/10
Note
Rule 10b-5: Scope of Liability
Extended as Former Outsiders
Become Market Insiders
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. (U.S. May 15, 1979) (No.
78-1202).
[W] e are well aware that the laws governing the securities
market become more intricate and finely spun daily. Some
engaged in the business of securities trading believe them-
selves to be characters from Victorian novels wandering
aimlessly on treacherous moors. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Rule lOb-5,2 promulgated pursuant to Section 10(b) 3 of the Se-
1. H. Kook & Co. v. Scheinman, Hochstin & Trotta, Inc., 414 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir.
1969).
2. Rule lOb-5 provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as rule lOb-5].
3. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any se-
curity not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
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curities Exchange Act of 1934,4 is perhaps the most formidable
weapon 5 available for use against those who would seek a fraudu-
lent or unfair advantage in securities transactions. A cursory re-
view of the salient features of the rule reveals the very nature of its
power. The basis of its strength emanates from the broad and
amorphous language found in the rule itself.6 By implication,
therefore, the scope of the rule remains unstated and undefined.
Several omissions are quite obvious. For instance, the rule does
not address or identify the elements needed to establish a breach
of lOb-5.7 Nor does it adequately delineate the size or composition
of the plaintiff and defendant class8 should a violation be shown.
Rather the rule simply expounds the unlawful nature of deceptive,
deceitful and manipulative practices in the purchase or sale of any
security.9 Hence, it is free from the restraints of any limiting lan-
guage and thus retains a degree of flexibility.'o
Since there are no clear indicia of congressional intent," the
task of defining and establishing the parameters of the rule has
been left largely to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the judicial branch. 12 The challenge has not gone un-
answered; witness the recent Second Circuit pronouncement in
4. Id. §§ 78a-78hh.
5. One commentator has observed: "If Rule X-10b-5 stood alone as a source of
private civil remedies, its terms would be broad enough to blanket almost all,
malpractices in securities transactions." Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-
10B-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1130
(1950).
6. See, e.g., Wright v. Heizer Corp., 411 F. Supp. 23,35 (N.D. Ill. 1975) ("genius of
lOb-5 lies in its breadth").
7. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975).
8. See generally § III of text infra.
9. See note 2 supra.
10. See, e.g., Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus.
LAw. 793, 922 (1967) (comments of Milton Freeman reveal the SEC's failure
to fully appreciate the rule's future impact).
11. Of nearly a thousand pages of hearings in the House, the combined
references to § 10(b) (then § 9(c)) would scarcely fill a page. Much
the same is true in the Senate.
The several committee Reports merely paraphrase the language
of the several Bills and add little or nothing to the evidence on intent.
1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES A.Y: FRAUD § 2.2(331), at 22.2-.3 (1977). See S.
REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 32 (1934).
12. The commentators as well have proffered their own thoughts. See generally
H. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcuRrrms AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAw §§ 9.01 to .23
(rev. ed. 1978); 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 11; A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE
lob-5 (rev. ed. 1978); L. Loss, SEcumrrms REGULATION ch. 9 (2d ed. Supp.
1969).
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United States v. Chiarella.13 Faced with the duty of determining
the permissible scope of defendants in a suit brought under sec-
tion 10(b) for non-disclosure, 14 the court gave an expansive read-
ing to rule 10b-5.15 A new concept was created regarding insider
trading liability.16 Whereas previous decisions and SEC rulings
under rule 10b-5 had limited liability for the non-disclosure of ma-
terial information in the trading of securities to the corporate in-
sider,'7 the tippee' 8 of an insider, or one standing in a special
relationship 19 with the injured party, the court in Chiarella went
further. More specifically, liability was extended to reach the mar-
13. 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), cert granted, 47 U.S.L.W. (U.S. May 15, 1979) (No.
78-1202).
14. See note 2 supra. Clause (b) of rule lOb-5 prohibits both misrepresentations
and partial truths, but it may not reach the problem presented in Chiarella,
silence or non-disclosure. It is necessary to look to clauses (a) and (c) which
proscribe complete silence when there is a duty to disclose. See, e.g., Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 733 & n.6 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461-62 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965); SEC v. Crofters, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 236, 255 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
See also 3 L. Loss, supra note 12, at 1439.
15. Other issues were of course raised in the case but are outside the ambit of
this note. See note 92 infra.
16. Insider trading is a term of art embracing the trading in securities by insiders
possessing inside information. Such an activity is prohibited by rule lob-5.
The term "insider" is more fully discussed in § III of text infra. "Inside infor-
mation" can be defined as non-public facts relating to the business of the is-
suer, its securities, operations and affairs. See generally 5 A. JAcOBS, supra
note 12, § 66.02 (b) (citing cases).
17. For a discussion as to who is an insider, see 3 I. Loss, supra note 12, at 1450-
54; W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 132-44 (1968);
Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Im-
plications of the Texas Gulf Sulfur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1280-84
(1965); Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of
Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLum. L. REV. 1361, 1383-90
(1965).
18. The term "tippee" like "insider" is a term of art-tippees have a duty of dis-
closure. Generally, the difference between an insider and a tippee stems
from the circumstances under which the inside information is received. A
tippee either does not learn inside information in a business capacity or does
not have a legitimate business reason for knowing the inside information.
For commentary, see Barnett, Neither a Tippor Nor a Tippee Be, 8 Hous. L.
REV. 278 (1970); Bromberg, Tippee Risks and Liabilities, 1970-1971 CORP.
PRAC. Comm. 411; Glickman, "Tippee" Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 20 KAN. L. REV. 47 (1971); Rapp &
Loeb, Tippee Liability and Rule 10b-5, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 55.
19. Special relationship liability, other than that of insiders or tippees, under rule
10b-5 has largely attached to those who occupy a position of trust and confi-
dence in relation to their customers. See, e.g., Chasins v. Smith, Barney &
Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970) (failure to disclose market-maker status vio-
lates rule lOb-5); Comment, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States-The
Supreme Court Speaks on Rule 10b-5, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 119, 125 (liability of
broker-dealers discussed).
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ket insider-a person having regular access to material nonpublic
market information. 20 Traditional notions regarding the need to
establish or show a relationship (fiduciary or otherwise) between
the buyer and seller have thus been supplanted. The Chiarella de-
cision does not mandate that a relationship between the parties be
shown before liability will attach. The change in emphasis is read-
ily apparent. Prior concerns over corporate insiders (and their
privies) trading on undisclosed inside information have been
broadened so as to become concerns over market insiders trading
on undisclosed market information. The market insider would,
like the corporate insider, be prohibited from using undisclosed
market information for trading purposes and thus fall under the
"disclose or abstain" rule articulated in the landmark decision of
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.2 1
It is the purpose of this note to examine the Chiarella decision
with regard not only to its relation to the past, but also as to its
implications for the future. Historically, it is useful to inquire
whether the market insider concept is indeed the next logical step
in the judicial evolution of rule 10b-5. Similarly, the question must
be posited whether the decision provides a workable standard for
imputing future liability.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
The defendant Vincent Chiarella was employed as a "mark-up
man" in the composing room of Pandick Press, a Manhattan firm
engaged in the printing of various financial papers and docu-
ments.22 When copy from a customer arrived at the shop, Chiarel-
la would select type fonts and page layouts and then pass the
manuscript on to be set into type. The documents handled in this
manner ranged from the more mundane papers such as annual re-
ports and proxy statements to the high drama paperwork sur-
rounding tender offers and takeover bids.
Between September 1975 and November of the following year,
Chiarella handled the raw material for an impending merger and
four tender offers.23 The procedure involved in the printing of doc-
uments of this kind was secretive in nature to preserve confidenti-
ality. In order to prevent an anticipatory rise in the market price of
20. "Market information" is outside information, see note 16 supra, or that infor-
mation that affects the price of a company's securities without affecting the
firm's earning power or assets. See also Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An
Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U.
PA. L. REv. 798, 799 (1973).
21. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See text accompa-
nying note 77 infra.
22. 588 F.2d at 1363.
23. Id.
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the target company's stock should news of the tender offer become
public, the type was set with certain information absent or in
code.24 Thus, when Emhart Corporation sought to gain control of
USM Corporation, the documents delivered to Pandick Press read
"Arabia Corp." and "USA Corp. '25 On the night before release the
true names would be inserted during the final press run.
Chiarella was, however, "not merely an ordinary printer, but a
knowledgeable stock trader. '26 In each of the five takeover bids
which he handled, he was able to decipher the name of the target
company from other available information-price histories, par
values and the number of letters in the mock corporate names. 27
He would then call his broker and buy shares in the target corpora-
tion.28 When the tender offer was publicly announced, the market
price of Chiarella's stock increased and he would sell at a hand-
some profit. In the Emhart tender offer he made a profit of
$1,091.11; over the course of his dealings in the five takeover bids he
netted more than $30,000.29
In 1977 the SEC began an investigation into Chiarella's activi-
ties. In May of that year he agreed to a consent decree 30 to give up
his profits to those who had sold him target stock. On January 4,
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Purchases
Target Offeror Shares Date Date Sold Profit
USM Emhart 300 9/5/75 9/9/75 $ 1,019.11
Riviana Colgate- 2300 2/5/76 to 2/26/76 to 8,948.55
Foods Palmolive 2/10/76 3/16/76
Food Town Delhaize 1100 10/11/76 10/21/76 to 2,990.30
Stores Freres 12/1/76
Booth Times- 100 10/21/76 10/22/76 914.56
Newspapers Mirror
Sprague General 3200 11/10/76 11/15/76 16,138.87
Electric Cable
Total Profit: $30,011.39
Id.
29. Id.
30. Other printers have felt the wrath of the SEC via consent decrees. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Manderano, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,357
(D.N.J. 1978); SEC v. Primar Typographers, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,734 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Ayoub, 11975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v.
Sorg Printing Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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1978, he was indicted on seventeen counts31 of willful misuse of
material nonpublic information in connection with the purchase
and sale of securities in violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
After unsuccessfully moving to dismiss the indictment,32 he was
convicted by a jury on every count.33
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Unfair or fraudulent transactions involving the trading of secur-
ities are not a modern day phenomena. Deceit in the marketplace
has previously taken many forms. A common element to such ac-
tivity, however, has usually been that one party has either misrep-
resented or omitted to disclose material facts to the other trading
party. In cases involving the active misrepresentation of material
facts the wrong is clearly identifiable since the injured party need
only show that a misrepresentation took place. Cases involving
non-disclosure or silence present difficulties. 34 Restated, the prob-
lem becomes one of identifying those situations in which a duty of
31. The indictment was brought under the penalty provision of the 1934 Act,
§ 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976):
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter, or
any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made un-
lawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this
chapter, or any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes
to be made, any statement in any application, report, or document
required to be ified under this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement
as provided in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, or by any
self-regulatory organization in connection with an application for
membership or participation therein or to become associated with a
member thereof which statement was false or misleading with re-
spect to any material fact, shall upon conviction be fined not more
than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, except
that when such person is an exchange, a fine not exceeding $500,000
may be imposed; but no person shall be subject to imprisonment
under this section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he
proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.
32. United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
33. Chiarella was sentenced to concurrent terms of one year on counts one
through thirteen, to be suspended following one month's imprisonment. Im-
position of sentence on the remaining counts was suspended and he was
placed on probation for five years following his release from prison.
34. A close analogy exists between tort "misfeasance" and 10b-5 affirma-
tive misrepresentation and between tort "nonfeasance" and 10b-5
nondisclosure: "Liability for 'misfeasance,' then, may extend to any
person to whom harm may reasonably be anticipated as a result of
the defendant's conduct, or perhaps even beyond; while for 'nonfea-
sance' it is necessary to find some definite relation between the par-
ties, of such a character that social policy justifies the imposition of a
duty to act."
Comment, supra note 19, at 122 n.24 (quoting W. PRoisER, THE LAw Op TORTS
339 (4th ed. 1971)).
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disclosure is present. The process by which such a duty is estab-
lished and the considerations underlying the imposition of such an
obligation are of obvious concern to the participants in the securi-
ties marketplace. The Chiarella decision concerns the duty to dis-
close. To fully appreciate the implications of market insider
liability it is necessary that the state of the law regarding liability
for non-disclosure prior to Chiarella be presented. Particular em-
phasis will be placed upon the broadening scope of liability both at
common law and under rule lOb-5.
A. Scope of Liability For Non-disclosure Under the Common Law
The development of the common law in the area of fraudulent
securities transactions was slow and uneven. Indeed, a defendant
who either made an affirmative misrepresentation or failed to dis-
close a material fact when purchasing securities often escaped the
imposition of liability altogether.35 Yet, this is not to say that all
plaintiffs were unsuccessful. The plaintiff who could allege the
existence of a misrepresentation by the defendant was in a better
position than one seeking to invoke liability because of silence or
non-disclosure. The cause of action for misrepresentation at least
was traceable to a progenitor in the common law-the action for
deceit. The injured party had to establish that defendant made a
false representation of a material fact with knowledge of its falsity
and with the intent that plaintiff rely thereon.
On the other hand, one who could only allege the concealment
of important facts (or non-disclosure) by the defendant 36 often had
no cause of action. It was generally held that no remedy was avail-
able for damages resulting from the other party's silence unless a
duty of disclosure existed.37 Some jurisdictions never imposed a
duty of disclosure. Others, however, did imply such a duty when
certain corporate insiders, e.g., directors, officers, and large share-
holders, dealt in the shares of their own company. Yet, even in this
regard there was a lack of uniformity as these jurisdictions es-
poused three separate and distinct views-majority, minority, and
special facts-regarding the duty of disclosure and insider trad-
ing.3 8
35. See, e.g., Note, Civil Liability Under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 VA. L. REv. 537, 552-53
(1956) (discussing pre-10b-5 law); Comment, supra note 5, at 1125. By fulfil-
ling these requirements and satisfying procedural requirements, the plaintiff
could prevail. 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 12, § 2.01 (a), at 1-8.
36. See note 35 supra.
37. Case Comment, A New Concept of Fraud on the Securities Exchange-A
Comment on In Re Cady [,] Roberts & Co., 15 S.C. L. REv. 557, 563 (1963) (pre-
10b-5 state of the law).
38. See, e.g., Annot., 84 A.LR. 615 (1933); Note, 53 L. Ed. 853 (1909).
[Vol. 58:866
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The majority rule rejected the imposition of a duty of disclosure
upon corporate insiders who dealt with their shareholders. While
a fiduciary obligation was recognized between the corporation and
the insider, the obligation did not extend to the individual share-
holder.3 9 It was reasoned that the insider owed no duty of disclo-
sure because the shareholder could look at the company books and
determine the value of the stock for himself.4 0 Furthermore, it was
believed that the shares possessed by a shareholder were indeed
his personal property and the insider had no relationship to the
property of the shareholder.4 1 Therefore, under the majority rule a
corporate insider could buy and sell the securities of his own cor-
poration even though he had inside information regarding their
value.42
Other jurisdictions followed the minority rule and imposed a
duty to disclose upon insiders who traded upon inside information.
It was reasoned that the insider should not benefit from his posi-
tion within the corporation:
It might be that the director was in possession of information which his
duty to the company required him to keep secret; and if so, he must not
disclose the fact even to the shareholder; for his obligation to the company
overrides that to an individual holder of the stock. But if the fact so
known to the director cannot be published, it does not follow that he may
use it to his own advantage, and to the disadvantage of one whom he also
represents. The very fact that he cannot disclose prevents him from deal-
ing with one who does not know, and to whom material information can-
not be made known. If, however, the fact within the knowledge of the
director is of a character calculated to affect the selling price, and can,
without detriment to the interest of the company, be imparted to the
shareholder, the director, before he buys, is bound to make a full disclo-
sure
4 3
Under this view the insider was perceived as an agent or trustee of
the shareholder. 4 Furthermore, it was often argued that it just
was not morally proper for the insider to take advantage of the
shareholder.45
A third common law interpretation regarding an insider's duty
of disclosure can be found in the "special facts" doctrine first ar-
ticulated in Strong v. Repide.4 6 The case involved an insider who
concealed information regarding an impending sale of company as-
39. Note, Purchaser's Duty to Disclose Under Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion Rule X-ZOB-5, 40 MmN. L REV. 62, 63 (1955) (disclosure at common law).
40. H. SPELLmAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LAw GovERNING CORPORATE
DIRECTORS § 247, at 615 (1931).
41. Note, supra note 35, at 547-48.
42. See Case Comment, supra note 37, at 561.
43. Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 368, 45 S.E. 232, 234 (1903).
44. See Note, supra note 35, at 550-51.
45. Id.
46. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
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sets from a seller of securities. The Supreme Court held that be-
cause of special facts the insider had a duty to disclose:
If it were conceded, for the purpose of the argument, that the ordinary
relations between directors and shareholders in a business corporation
are not of such a fiduciary nature as to make it the duty of a director to
disclose to a shareholder the general knowledge which he may possess
regarding the value of the shares of the company before he purchases any
from a shareholder, yet there are cases where, by reason of the special
facts, such duty exists.
4 7
The essence of the rule flows from the fact that the buyer is pos-
sessed of superior knowledge or means of acquiring information.4 8
The ultimate value of the "special facts" doctrine was, however,
questionable. One writer has suggested that "[t]he 'special cir-
cumstances' rule neither supports nor repudiates the theory that a
corporate insider has no fiduciary relation with shareholders from
whom he purchases stock of his corporation and that to constitute
fraud there must be actual misrepresentation. '49
As a result of its restrictiveness, few successful suits were
maintained under a common law action for non-disclosure. Those
that were entertained applied principally to corporate insiders.
Yet, this is not to say that efforts to reach beyond the insider under
the common law have not been made. Indeed, the Second Circuit
in Schein v. Chasen,50 as one commentator has written, "breathed
novel life into earlier state law cases."5 1 In this case of first impres-
sion, it was held that a derivative suit on behalf of a corporation
could be maintained against outsiders who traded on inside infor-
mation.5 2 Although later vacated,5 3 the decision presents consider-
ations parallel to those found in Chiarella and hence it is useful to
consider the case and its subsequent history in detail.
Schein was a diversity suit brought by shareholders of the af-
47. Id. at 431.
48. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 12, at 1446-48. One writer has suggested that the
ability to trade on such information is a necessary incentive to stimulate en-
trepreneurial activity. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
138-41 (1966). But see Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne,
Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REv. 1425 (1967). Professor
Manne has replied to his critics. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Profes-
sors, 23 VAND. L. REv. 547 (1970).
49. See Case Comment, supra note 37, at 563.
50. 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded sub nom. Lehman Bros. v.
Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974). For detailed treatment of this case, see E. BROD-
SKY, GUIDE TO SECURITIES LITIGATION 121 (1974); Note, "Tippee" Liability Ex-
tended to Remote Third Parties, 53 NEB. L. REv. 279 (1974).
51. Kapp, Trading on Undisclosed Material Information: Scope of Liability and
Selective Disclosure, in FRAUD, INSIDE INFORMATION, AND FIDUCIARY DUTY
UNDER RULE 10b-5, 571, 575 (2d ed. 1976).
52. 478 F.2d at 823.
53. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
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fected corporation against several mutual funds which traded on
inside information. The complaint alleged that since corporate in-
formation had been appropriated, a duty to the corporation had
been breached in violation of Florida law. No securities laws were
cited as a basis for the action. 4 The court, finding no Florida case
on point, looked to Diamond v. Oreamuno,55 a New York decision
upholding the right of shareholders to sue derivatively on behalf of
a corporation to recover profits from insiders who traded on inside
information. 56 While it is obvious that Diamond involved insid-
ers57 trading on inside information and that Schein involved out-
siders trading on inside information, the court reasoned that
common elements were involved.5 8 Third parties,59 though not di-
rectors or officers of the injured corporation, who engaged in a
common enterprise with insiders to misuse inside information
were held in Schein to fall under the Diamond doctrine.60
Judge Kaufman,61 in a strong dissent, rejected the notion that
persons who are not insiders of a corporation may be found liable
under some theory involving a breach of duty to the corporation:
In my view, it is no longer debatable that trading on inside information
merits universal condemnation. The undesirable nature of "insider trad-
ing" is reflected in the prophylactic provisions of Section 16(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 and the more general antifraud principles of
Section 10(b) of that Act. I fully agree with Judges Waterman and Smith
that one with access to material inside information concerning a corpora-
tion's affairs who knowingly purchases or sells that corporation's shares
before this information has become publicly available takes unfair advan-
tage of unknowledgeable parties to the transaction. Indeed, the factual
claims contained in the complaints before us have led to two federal ac-
tions-an SEC injunctive action and a private class action under rule lOb-
5-now pending in the District Court for the Southern District of New
York. But the adage that hard facts make bad law is about to come true
here, despite Judge, later Justice, Cardozo's warning that judges are not
free agents roaming at will to create law to fit the facts .... In the ab-
sence of any viable precedent upon which to base the totally new concept
of law espoused by my brothers, it is clear that they announce an ex-
54. A common law derivative action on behalf of the corporation was presumably
brought because plaintiffs were not buyers during the "illegal trading pe-
riod." See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An As-
sessment, 4 SEC. L. REv. 290, 293-94 (1972).
55. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
56. Id. at 494, 498, 248 N.E.2d at 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 78, 81.
57. See Case Comment, supra note 37, at 566.
58. 478 F.2d at 822.
59. Before Schein no common law decision had found remote "tippees" to be lia-
ble. See generally Rapp & Loeb, supra note 18.
60. 478 F.2d at 823.
61. A few years later, Judge Kaufman was to again face the issue of outsider
liability for non-disclosure in Chiarella. The action, however, was brought
not under the common law but under rule lob-5.
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traordinary, expansive, and incorrect reading of New York law solely be-
cause of their urge to "provid[e] a disincentive to insider trading." I agree
with their objective but I question the means employed.
The court holds today that a person with no relationship whatso-
ever-fiduciary or otherwise-to a corporation, who trades its shares on
the basis of material inside information becomes, ipsofacto, a fiduciary of
the corporation whose shares he traded .... 62
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded Schein with instruc-
tions to refer to the Florida courts to determine Florida law.63 As a
result the corporation was held unable to recover in the absence of
a showing of actual damage.6 The Florida Supreme Court approv-
ingly quoted Judge Kaufman's dissenting opinion in stating its be-
lief that a duty of disclosure did not extend beyond the traditional
insider of the corporation.65 The effort to reach the outsider had
failed.
Hence, under the common law66 there was generally no recog-
nized cause of action for silence or the non-disclosure of material
inside information. Excepted from this general rule, however,
were situations in which a fiduciary relationship could be estab-
lished. A duty of disclosure then arose. The extent of that fiduci-
ary obligation, when and if it could be shown, was nevertheless
very limited. The liability of the corporate insider, for example, did
not extend to the non-shareholder nor did it reach transactions on
a stock exchange. 67 Even more notable was the limitation that
such a duty of disclosure only attached to corporate insiders: di-
rectors, officers and major shareholders. The insider's relationship
to the corporation served as the basis for imputing or triggering
that fiduciary duty.
62. 478 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1973) (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(citing B. CARnozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921)).
63. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
64. Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975), aff'd, 519 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1975).
65. Id. at 743-46.
66. In the past few years a number of states have passed statutes dealing with
the problem of insider trading. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25402 (West
1977):
It is unlawful for an issuer or any person who is an officer, director or
controlling person of an issuer or any other person whose relation-
ship to the issuer gives him access, directly or indirectly, to material
information about the issuer not generally available to the public, to
purchase or sell any security of the issuer in this state at a time when
he knows material information about the issuer gained from such re-
lationship which would significantly affect the market price of that
security and which is not generally available to the public, and which
he knows is not intended to be so available, unless he has reason to
believe that the person selling to or buying from him is also in pos-
session of the information.
67. Perry v. Pearson, 135 Ill. 218, 25 N.E. 636 (1890). See Case Comment, supra
note 37, at 564.
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B. Scope of Liability For Non-disclosure Under Rule 10b-5
Whereas attempts to expand liability beyond the traditional in-
sider have generally proved fruitless under the common law, such
efforts have enjoyed a modicum of success under rule lOb-5. The
lack of any clear congressional direction 68 has left the courts free
to pursue the broad policy objective of section 10(b)-the preven-
tion of fraud.69 A trend toward broader liability has emerged as
frontier areas of liability are identified and subsequently covered
by the rule. The state of the law after the enactment of the federal
securities laws was for most purposes similar to the scope of liabil-
ity recognized at common law.70 Despite the fact that rule 10b-5
prohibits "any person" 71 from engaging in prohibited activities, the
rule was initially applied only to those persons defined under Sec-
tion 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.72
In Cady, Roberts & Co.,73 however, the SEC signalled that the
scope of liability under rule 10b-5 extended beyond the traditional
insider. The question in that case was whether a broker-dealer
had violated rule 10b-5 by trading after it acquired inside informa-
tion conveyed by a representative of the brokerage firm who also
served as a director of the corporation. The SEC held:
[Officers, directors, and controlling shareholders] do not exhaust the
classes of persons upon whom there is such an obligation [to disclose].
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the exist-
ence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the per-
sonal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved
where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavaila-
ble to those with whom he is dealing. In considering these elements
under the broad language of the anti-fraud provisions we are not to be
circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid classifications. Thus our task
here is to identify those persons who are in special relationship with a
company and privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative
duties in trading in its securities. Intimacy demands restraint lest the un-
informed be exploited.74
68. See note 11 & accompanying text supra.
69. Some have claimed that the term fraud as used in the Act was not limited to
common law concepts but was designed to include "all deceitful practices
contrary to the plain rules of common honesty." Loss, The SEC and the Bro-
ker-Dealer, 1 VAND. L. Rav. 516, 517 (1948) (citing People v. Federated Radio
Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 38, 154 N.E. 655, 657-58 (1926)).
70. See generally Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del 1951);
Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943); Case Comment, supra note
37, at 565.
71. See note 2 supra.
72. Section 16 defines corporate insiders as officers, directors and "[e]very per-
son who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per cen-
turn of any class of any equity security... ." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976).
73. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
74. Id. at 912 (footnotes omitted).
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The test gleaned from this opinion concerned the circumstances
under which a person obtained inside information. The emphasis
was on a relationship with the corporation giving "access" to the
inside informationj 5
The next major watershed in the evolution of rule lOb-5 liability
for non-disclosure occured in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.7 6 Of-
ficers and employees of the company made purchases of company
stock after learning about the great potential for an extraordinary
ore discovery. The SEC alleged that the insiders as well as their
tippees had violated rule 1Ob-5. The court, after re-stating the
Cady, Roberts access test, declared:
Insiders, as directors or management officers are, of course, by this Rule,
precluded from so unfairly dealing, but the Rule is also applicable to one
possessing the information who may not be strictly termed an "insider"
within the meaning of Sec. 16(b) of the [Exchange] Act .... Thus, any-
one in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to
the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to pro-
tect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from
trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside
information remains undisclosed. So, it is here no justification for insider
activity that disclosure was forbidden by the legitimate corporate objec-
tive of acquiring options to purchase the land surrounding the exploration
site; if the information was, as the SEC contends, material, its possessors
should have kept out of the market until disclosure was accomplished.
7 7
The court of appeals in this decision seemed to adopt a "posses-
sion" test in addition to the "access" test.78 This holding has been
the source of some confusion among the commentators who have
suggested a variety of interpretations regarding the interaction of
the access test and possession test;7 9 whether it served to merely
augment the access test or to modify it has been unclear. Cases
before 8° and after8 1 Texas Gulf Sulfur do not seem to offer any de-
finitive synthesis of the two tests. 82 In either event it is clear that
75. Id.
76. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
77. Id. at 848 (footnote omitted; citations omitted).
78. 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note 12, at 3-273.
79. Id. at 3-275 n.19 (citing among others: Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulfur-The Second
Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63
Nw. U.L REv. 423,438-40 & n.88 (1968); Sandier & Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulfur;
Reform in the Securities Marketplace, 30 OHo ST. L.J. 225, 238-42 (1969); Note,
How Big a House of Cards? Private Actions and Insiders Under Rule 10b-5, 6
SAN DiEGo L. REV. 243, 263 (1969); Case Comment, supra note 37, at 559, 572
(1963)).
80. See 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note 12, at 3-275 & n.20 (citing cases).
81. Id. at 3-275 & n.21 (citing cases).
82. One commentator has offered the following as a rationalization of the two
tests:
The best analysis would require that an insider or a tippee must have
both possession of inside information and direct or indirect access.
No restrictions with respect to trading and recommending are im-
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those held liable in Texas Gulf Sulfur, if not traditional insiders,
had at a minimum obtained inside information because of an em-
ployment relationship with the corporation. Hence, the need to
show a nexus between the insider and the corporation under ei-
ther the possession or access test continued as a vital element.
Even this nexus requirement, however, came under attack in a
case decided shortly after Texas Gulf Sulfur. In SEC v. Great
American Industries, Inc.,83 several judges of the Second Circuit
expressed a willingness to extend the duty of disclosure beyond
previously recognized notions of fiduciary obligations. The case
concerned several persons who sold mining properties to Great
American in exchange for its shares. The sellers did not disclose
the fact that a substantial part of the price would be allocated to
finders. The majority of the Second Circuit held that the facts
went beyond mere non-disclosure and did not find it necessary to
determine whether there should be a duty of disclosure:
It must be conceded that imposing on sellers of property or finders a duty
of full disclosure to a buyer issuing securities in exchange, with a conse-
quent duty on the part of the latter to publicize material facts so disclosed,
would increase the protection afforded investors and traders by the secur-
ities laws. On the other hand, to read Rule 10b-5 as placing an affirmative
duty of disclosure on persons who in contrast to "insiders" or broker-deal-
ers did not occupy a special relationship to a seller or buyer of securities,
would be occupying new ground and would require most careful consider-
ation.84
Judge Kaufman, in concurrence, expressed a willingness to occupy
this new ground:
Those who buy or sell securities may no longer assume that the un-
mended fences of common law fraud will remain the outer limits of liabil-
ity under Rule 10b-5....
In sum, any claim that material facts were withheld in a transaction in
connection with the sale or purchase of securities must be scrutinized
with care, whether or not there would have been liability at common law
for such a deed.85
posed on an insider or a tippee unless he has actual or perhaps con-
structive knowledge-i.e., possession-of inside information.
Clearly, an insider or tippee needs actual knowledge of inside infor-
mation before he can tip it. Therefore, possession of inside informa-
tion is a prerequisite for imposing limits on insiders or tippees, and
hence, in any meaningful sense possession is also needed before
someone can be an insider or a tippee. Access is equally needed. An
insider has access because he obtains his information in his business
capacity. A tippee must get inside information about the issuer from
an insider or from a tippee who acquired it from an insider, so the
tippee also has access, albeit indirectly.
Id. at 3-277 to -278 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).
83. 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).
84. Id. at 460.
85. Id. at 462-63 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
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Finally, in order to complete this historical introduction, it is
necessary to consider Investors Management Co., 86 a case in
which an aircraft manufacturer disclosed information regarding its
earnings to a broker-dealer who disseminated the information
throughout the various departments of the firm. Members of the
individual departments in turn passed the information to several
institutional clients. Large amounts of stock were sold before the
revised earnings estimate became public. The SEC determined
that the prohibitions of rule lOb-5 applied to even the very remote
tippee:
We consider that one who obtains possession of material, non-public
corporate information, which he has reason to know emanates from a cor-
porate source, and which by itself places him in a position superior to
other investors, thereby acquires a relationship with respect to that infor-
mation within the purview and restraints of the antifraud provisions.
87
In a concurring opinion Commissioner Smith sought to emphasize
the need for some relationship to the corporation in that the
prohibitions of rule 10b-5 should apply principally to corporate in-
siders and their privies.88
In summation, it can be seen that rule lob-5 has undergone an
evolutionary transformation. The scope of liability for non-disclo-
sure has broadened beyond that recognized at common law as the
concept of the traditional insider has been altered by the "access"
test89 of Cady, Roberts and the "possession" test 90 of Texas Gulf
Sulfur. Yet a quick perusal of these and other decisions 91 reveals
the presence of several constants. In the area of non-disclosure,
rule 10b-5 has only been applied to those persons having some re-
lationship to the corporation whose securities were traded. Indeed
the inside information itself may provide the basis for that rela-
tionship. Restated, it would appear that for rule 10b-5 to apply, the
"minimum" nexus necessary would be that the undisclosed infor-
mation originate or emanate from the affected corporation.
IV. THE COURT'S DECISION
On appeal, Chiarella admitted to the activities outlined in the
86. 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971). See also Comment, Investors Management Company
and Rule lOb-5--The Tippee at Bay, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 545 (1972); Comment,
Investors Management: Institutional Investors As Tippees, 119 U. PA. L. REV.
502 (1971).
87. 44 S.E.C. at 644.
88. Id. at 648. See text accompanying note 120 infra.
89. See note 74 & accompanying text supra.
90. See note 77 & accompanying text supra.
91. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Investors
Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
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government's indictment but challenged his conviction on the
ground92 that he was outside the reach of section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 as well as rule 10b-5. Citing the hold-
ing in Texas Gulf Sulfur,93 he reasoned that since he was not an
insider of the target corporations he owed no fiduciary duty to the
target shareholders who sold their stock. Hence, he claimed he
was not subject to the "disclose or abstain" rule.of Texas Gulf Sul-
fur and had not violated rule 10b-5.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected his argu-
ments and affirmed the jury verdict. The basis for that decision, as
articulated by Chief Judge Kaufman, was founded upon the court's
perception of the congressional policy underlying the enactment of
the federal securities laws. Quite simply it was argued that such
measures were passed to "protect the integrity of the marketplace
in which securities are traded."94 The court claimed that the phi-
losophy of caveat emptor was not a proper standard; it had been
supplanted by a system requiring equal access to information nec-
essary for reasoned investment decisions.95 Chiarella had violated
basic principles of fairness and had impugned the integrity of the
securities marketplace.
More specifically, the court claimed that the defendant had con-
strued the principles underlying Texas Gulf Sulfur too narrowly.96
While it was true that he has not an insider of the target corpora-
tions, that fact was deemed irrelevant. 97 He had gained an unfair
advantage and had reaped as much benefit as any insider. Refer-
ring to the congressional purpose in enacting the securities laws,
the court declared that "[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who
regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use
that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirma-
tive duty to disclose. And if he cannot disclose, he must abstain
92. Other issues were also raised on appeal. Chiarella contended to no avail that
the fair notice element of the due process clause would be violated if rule lob-
5 were given such an expansive reading in a criminal case. The dissent ex-
pressed similar fears: 'Today's decision expands § 10(b) drastically,. . . and
alarmingly, it does so in the context of a criminal case." 588 F.2d at 1373 (Mes-
kill, J., dissenting). See also 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 11, § 10.3, at 241
(criminal aspects of rule lOb-5).
An issue also arose concerning the nature of the intent required to estab-
lish a criminal violation of rule lOb-5. The court held that the government
need only show that the defendant engaged in "knowingly wrongful" conduct
and was not required to prove a specific intent to defraud. 588 F.2d at 1371.
93. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
94. 588 F.2d at 1365 (quoting United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336, 339 (2d Cir.
1977)).
95. 588 F.2d at 1362.
96. Id. at 1365.
97. Id. at 1364.
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from buying or selling."98
The scope of liability under rule lOb-5 was thus expanded to
include the market insider-one who has regular access to market
information. The court likened this new concept to the category of
"quasi-insider" mentioned by the American Law Institute (ALI) in
its proposed Federal Securities Code.99 Furthermore, the majority
claimed support from the fact that the ALI had proposed that its
version of rule 10b-5100 could in most cases be used to reach partic-
ularly egregious fraudulent transactions not falling under the lan-
guage of its insider section.' 0 ' The court characterized Chiarella's
conduct as sufficiently egregious to fit even the most restrictive
definition of a quasi-insider.
The court garnered further justification for affirming Chiarella's
conviction from Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.10 2 This
was a civil action involving the First Security Bank of Utah which
acted as transfer agent for shares of the Ute Development Corpora-
tion, which was created by the federal government to hold assets
for a group of mixed-blood Ute Indians. Two employees of the
bank sought to buy stock in the corporation from its Indian share-
holders at a low price and re-sell the shares at a profit to a market
consisting of whites. The Supreme Court held that such activities
violated rule lOb-5 and gave rise to a duty of disclosure.10 3 The
Second Circuit considered the case significant because it seem-
ingly equated regular access to market information with a duty of
disclosure.
The court then addressed the issue whether Chiarella could re-
lieve himself of his market insider's duty of disclosure by claiming
the protection of the tender offeror who was the source of his infor-
mation. Because a tender offeror may purchase up to five percent
of the stock of its prospective target without any requirement of
disclosure, 04 the defendant sought to clothe himself with a similar
98. Id. at 1365.
99. ALI, FEDERAL SECURIES CODE (Proposed Official Draft, March 15, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE].
100. Id. § 1602.
(a) [ General.] It is unlawful for any person to engage in a fraudu-
lent act or to make a misrepresentation in connection with (1) a sale
or purchase of a security, an offer to sell or buy a security, or an in-
ducement not to buy or sell a security, (2) a proxy solicitation or
other circularization of security holders in respect of a security of a
registrant, (3) a tender offer or a recommendation to security holders
in favor of or opposition to a tender offer, or (4) activity or proposed
activity as an investment adviser.
101. Id. § 1603, Comment 3(d).
102. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). See Comment, supra note 19.
103. 406 U.S. at 152-53.
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (1976).
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exemption. The attempt proved unsuccessful as the court held
that a tender offeror is not a market insider since it does not re-
ceive market information but in fact creates it. Furthermore, the
majority reasoned that there was a substantial difference in as-
sumed economic risk' 05 between the tender offeror and someone
in Chiarella's position. The tender offeror faced real economic
unknowns while Chiarella suffered no economic risk. His liability
was, therefore, not derivative.
In conclusion, the Chiarella court reiterated its belief that the
imposition of a duty of disclosure upon the market insider was but
a logical application and extension of the congressional policies
underlying the rule of Texas Gulf Sulfur. "[T]he Rule is based in
policy on the justifiable expectations of the securities marketplace
that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively
equal access to material information."'10
V. ANALYSIS
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores,0 7 critically observed that "[w] hen we deal
with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." 108 The
decision by the Second Circuit in Chiarella can be said to have
caused another acorn to germinate. That the creation of the mar-
ket insider concept drastically expands the scope of liability under
rule 10b-5 cannot be denied since previously the rule had been ap-
plied only to corporate insiders, tippees of the insider or those
standing in a special relationship to traders in the market.
It now remains to consider the validity and effect of that deci-
sion in light of the following inquiries: (1) whether the supportive
authorities cited by the majority are of persuasive precedential
value to sustain the creation of market insider liability and (2) the
implications of the Chiarella decision.
A. Authority for Market Insider Liability
"That appellant was not an insider of the companies whose se-
105. The dissent, however, was not convinced that economic risk is at all determi-
native: "We have been cited no case holding that the degree of risk assumed
by a trader in possession of nonpublic information is determinative of the
trader's liability for nondisclosure or renders his conduct fraudulent." 588
F.2d at 1375 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
106. 588 F.2d at 1365 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.
1968)).
107. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
108. Id. at 737.
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curities he traded is true, but irrelevant."' 09 In this one sentence
the majority has succeeded in erasing many of the previously es-
tablished limits on liability for non-disclosure under rule lOb-5.
The fact that Chiarella was not an insider is not irrelevant if
viewed from the proper perspective. For the basic elements under-
lying the notion of corporate insider liability provide or serve to
establish the whole nature of any duty of disclosure under rule
10b-5.
Whereas prior decisions centered around the misuse of inside
corporate information, the court in Chiarella talks of the misuse of
"market" information."l0 The required element of a relationship to
a corporation giving access to inside information has been trans-
formed in Chiarella to the need to show an access to "market" in-
formation. The court claimed support from several sources
including the congressional policies underlying the decision in
Texas Gulf Sulfur, the Supreme Court decision in Affiliated Ute
Citizens, and the ALI's codification efforts in the Federal Securities
Code. It is only proper that an inquiry be undertaken to examine
the authority cited by the majority for such a change.
The court claimed initial support from the intent manifested by
Congress in enacting the anti-fraud provision of the securities
laws."' Armed with the obligation to preserve the integrity of the
marketplace, it is reasonable, argued the court, to include market
insiders within the ambit of the anti-fraud provision. Indeed the
court states at one point, "Congress did not limit itself to protect-
ing shareholders from the peculations of their officers and direc-
tors."'112 While this statement may be true, it does not follow that
the reach of 10b-5 is unlimited. If the rule were to be given such an
expansive reading there would be little need for the other provi-
sions of the securities laws; rule 10b-5 would be the sword by
which unfairness and dishonesty would fall.
Furthermore, the statement is misleading and sets up a straw
man for the Second Circuit to knock down. Rule lOb-5 does reach
beyond officers and directors. As articulated earlier, prior case law
established that rule 10b-5 does extend beyond the traditional
common law notion of the insider. Yet this should not be con-
strued to be a license to implement any notions of marketplace
egalitarianism. A perusal of prior case law shows that, while the
scope of liability has broadened, certain constants have remained.
By deeming Chiarella's lack of insider status irrelevant the court
ignored previous interpretations of congressional intent.
109. 588 F.2d at 1364.
110. See note 20 supra.
111. 588 F.2d at 1365.
112. Id.
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That intent is embodied in the efforts of the courts and the SEC
to establish various tests to determine when a duty of disclosure
arises. The "access" test of Cady, Roberts requiring the existence
of a relationship to the corporation whose stock has been traded is
the cornerstone of rule 10b-5 liability for non-disclosure. The re-
quirement of a relationship giving access simply reflects notions of
fiduciary obligations developed under common law and federal
law.113 The holding in Texas Gulf Sulfur reaffirmed this belief as
the Second Circuit acknowledged in that decision that the Cady,
Roberts analysis was the "essence" of rule 10b-5. Yet, the court in
Chiarella chose to ignore this aspect of Texas Gulf Sujfur and sim-
ply claimed support from the congressional policies underlying
that decision. Judge Meskill, in dissent in Chiarella,114 ironically
pointed out that the Second Circuit itself in Radiation Dynamics,
Inc. v. Goldmuntz1 5 remarked: "The essential purpose of Rule
10b-5, as we have stated time and time again, is to prevent corpo-
rate insiders and their tippees from taking unfair advantage of the
uninformed outsider." 1" 6 Under Chiarella the "essential purpose"
of rule 10b-5 appears to have undergone a transformation.
Yet it must also be acknowledged that recent administrative
proceedings and case law suggested a change of sorts. Some deci-
sions have expanded the notion of a duty to the corporation to one
of a duty to the marketplace. 117 However, these decisions have
also re-emphasized a basic ingredient gleaned from Cady, Roberts
and Texas Gulf Sulfr-the non-public information must originate
with the corporation whose stock has been traded. In Investors
Management Co.,118 the SEC, while broadening the class of tippees
subject to rule 10b-5, acknowledged as much:
W'e consider that one who obtains possession of material, non-public
corporate information, which he has reason to know emanates from a cor-
porate source, and which by itself places him in a position superior to
other investors, thereby acquires a relationship with respect to that infor-
mation within the purview and restraints of the antifraud provisions.
1 1 9
Commissioner Smith in a special concurrence wrote that the em-
phasis of rule 10b-5 "should continue to be upon the conduct of
corporate insiders and their privies, . . . rather than upon a con-
cept-too vague for me to apply with any consistency--of relative
113. See, e.g., 3 L. Loss, supra note 12, at 1445-53 (summarizes relationship be-
tween common law doctrines of fiduciary obligations and the law under rule
10b-5).
114. 588 F.2d at 1374 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
115. 464 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1972).
116. Id. at 890.
117. See cases cited in note 91 supra.
118. 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
119. Id. at 644.
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informational advantage in the marketplace.' 1 20
The Second Circuit interpretation of congressional intent is
therefore somewhat at odds with prior case law interpreting the
same policies. Beginning with Cady, Roberts and continuing
through Texas Gulf Sulfur and Investors Management Co. it is
clear that while an expansion of the notion of duty has occurred
there has been a continual need to show some kind of nexus with
the affected corporation or injured party. Chiarella was not an in-
sider nor did his information emanate from the corporation whose
stock was traded. While the court admits this much, it neglects the
broader implications of the nature of the insider's duty-the need
to show a relationship which serves to trigger a fiduciary obliga-
tion.
The majority also found support for its holding from the
Supreme Court decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States.121 Two employees of a bank, which acted as a transfer
agent for a corporation administering the assets of Ute Indians,
bought stock from the Indian shareholders at a low price and re-
sold the stock in a non-Indian market. The Court held that the de-
fendants had a duty to disclose the fact that there was a price dif-
ference between the two markets as well as the defendants'
market maker status. 122 The majority in Chiarella claimed that
this imposition of duty resulted from the defendants' access to
market information and as such was applicable to the factual situa-
tion before it.123 Such a conclusion, however, is far from convinc-
ing.
In discussing the factors which led to the duty of disclosure in
Affiliated Ute Citizens, the Court stated that there would have
been no duty to inform the sellers that the stock was selling at a
higher price in another market if the bank had acted merely as a
transfer agent for the stock.124 Rather the duty arose because of
the fact that (1) the defendants "'were active in encouraging a
market for the UDC stock among non-Indians' ";12 (2) "[t]he men,
and hence the bank . . .were 'entirely familiar with the prevailing
market for the shares at all material times' ";126 (3) "[t]he bank
120. Id. at 648.
121. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
122. Id. at 153.
123. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1368-69.
124. "We would agree that if the two men and the employer bank had functioned
merely as a transfer agent, there would have been no duty of disclosure
here." 406 U.S. at 151-52. The statement would suggest that absent something
more, one in mere possession of market information would be under no duty
of disclosure.
125. Id. at 152 (citing Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1345 (10th Cir. 1970)).
126. 406 U.S. at 152 (citing Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d at 1347)).
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itself had acknowledged ... that 'it would be [its] duty to see
that these transfers were properly made' and that, with respect to
the sale of shares, 'the bank would be acting for the individual
shareholders.' "127 The result, therefore, seemed to be based on
more than mere access to market information as the majority in
Chiarella contends.
Thus the factors underlying the imposition of a duty upon cor-
porate insiders applied equally to those in a special relationship to
the trader. Again, the common element was the existence of a re-
lationship between the parties involving "inherent trust and reli-
ance by the plaintiffs."'1 2 8 The Second Circuit in Chiarella ignored
the relationship requirement and chose merely to emphasize the
access elements of the Affiliated Ute decision.
The Chiarella court also cited the ALI's Federal Securities
Code1 29 as a final basis upon which to rest the new liability im-
posed upon the market insider. More specifically, the court took
solace in the fact that the ALI suggested the creation of a class of
"quasi-insiders" which the majority called closely akin to the mar-
ket insider. Yet as the dissent in Chiarella points out 130 it is
equally clear that the ALI ultimately rejected this notion and
chose to impose a duty of disclosure only upon insiders. Section
1603 of the proposed Code provides:
(a) [ GeneraL] It is unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a security of the
issuer, if he knows a fact of special significance with respect to the issuer
or the security that is not generally available, unless (1) the insider rea-
sonably believes that the fact is generally available or (2), if the other
party to the transaction (or his agent) is identified, (A) the insider reason-
able believes that that person knows it, or (B) that person in fact knows it
from the insider or otherwise.
(b) ["Insider."] "Insider" means (1) the issuer, (2) a director or of-
ficer of, or a person controlling, controlled by, or under common control
with, the issuer, (3) a person whose relationship or former relationship to
the issuer gives or gave him access to a fact of special significance about
the issuer or the security that is not generally available, or (4) a person
who learns such a fact from a person specified in section 1603(b) (includ-
ing a person specified in section 1603 (b) (4)) with knowledge that the
person from whom he learns the fact is such a person, unless the Commis-
sion or a court finds that it would be inequitable, on consideration of the
circumstances and the purposes of this Code (including the deterrent ef-
fect of liability), to treat the person specified in section 1603 (b) (4) as if he
were specified in section 1603 (b) (1), (2), or (3).131
It is interesting to note that the concept of relationship or of rela-
tionship giving access is retained by the AL as a basic require-
127. 406 U.S. at 152.
128. See Comment, supra note 19, at 128.
129. See notes 99-101 & accompanying text supra.
130. 588 F.2d at 1374 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
131. FEDERAL SECU~rrMES CODE § 1603, at 528-29.
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ment for imposing a duty of disclosure. 132
The decision by the ALl to forego imposing a duty upon outsid-
ers was based largely upon perceived difficulties of definition, in-
deed, in Comment 3(d) to section 1603133 the ALI specifically but
respectfully rejected the position adopted by the three concurring
judges in SEC v. Great American Industries, Inc.13 4 to expand lia-
bility beyond previously recognized perceptions of fiduciary obli-
gations. The ALI argued that "it is hard to find justification today
for imposing a fiduciary's duty of affirmative disclosure on an out-
sider who is not a 'tippee.' "135 Judge Kaufman, the author of the
Chiarella decision, was one of the three concurring judges in Great
American Industries.
In sum, it is clear that section 10(b) is activated not by mere
elements of unfairness but by fraud. And it is black letter law that
silence or non-disclosure, unlike misrepresentation, is fraud only
when there is a duty to speak.136 The courts have found such a
duty when insiders and tippees or those in a special relationship
with the injured party use information attained because of that re-
lationship to trade in securities. Under the common law it was rea-
soned that liability arose only when a fiduciary, the corporate
insider, breached his obligations. Under rule 10b-5 while there has
been a broadening of the scope of liability it has been shown that
there is still a need to show some nexus or relation between the
parties. While Chiarella's conduct cannot be condoned, it can be
forcefully argued that his actions simply fall outside rule lOb-5 as it
now exists.
B. Implications
The impact of the Chiarella decision upon rule lOb-5 may prove
to be both far reaching and dramatic. The imposition of a duty of
disclosure founded upon expanded notions of market fairness de-
parts from prior legal thought. Whereas a duty of disclosure was
previously imposed upon those who assumed a role or acquired a
relationship with another based upon some fiduciary concept
(thus a limited application of the fairness principle), the position
expounded by the Second Circuit would require no such relation-
ship. One who possesses knowledge of material facts unknown to
the other party and which are not public will conceivably be under
a duty of disclosure prior to any trading. No relationship between
the parties need be shown.
132. For a similar requirement of relationship at the state level, see note 66 supra.
133. FEDERAL SECURrlIES CODE, at 538-39.
134. 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).
135. FEDERAL SECURIES CODE, at 538.
136. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 106; 3 L. Loss, supra note 12, ch. 9C.
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Problems of scope and application are obviously inherent in the
market insider principle. What is to be the standard by which fu-
ture market participants may pattern their behavior to avoid liabil-
ity? What liability, if any, attaches to tippees of market insiders?
Will any informational advantage trigger a duty of disclosure? Is
there any room under the concept by which a market insider may
show that his informational advantage was a reward for economic
savy?137 Are prior conceptions regarding a competitive market
now supplanted by a broader concern with fairness and parity of
information?
The decision offers little in the way of answers to these ques-
tions. No reasoned analysis was undertaken by the court to limit
the scope of application. Indeed, the equal access principle may
have effects beyond that envisioned by the court. An example will
better illustrate the problem. While in the instant case Chiarella
was not authorized by the tender offeror to use the information
contained in the printing materials for his own advantage, what if
the corporation had sold him that information? As an asset it is
conceivable that corporate management had the right to sell it.
The practice of "warehousing"1 38 reflects this basic transaction. If
the tender offeror, who is not a market insider under the Chiarella
decision, 3 9 sells information regarding an impending transaction
to several pension funds, who in turn purchase stock in the target
corporation, do the prohibitions regarding the market insider ap-
ply?14 0
Such transactions have occured and have been the subject of a
study done by the SEC.14 1 While it was concluded that purchases
by the pension funds of stock of the tender offeror were violative of
rule lOb-5 (as a traditional relationship existed giving access to the
acquiring company), no mention was made of liability for
purchases of stock in the target company. Indeed, it was con-
cluded that warehousing should be dealt with under new rules
rather than by applying rule lOb-5.142 Herein lies a broader aspect
137. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 20, at 816.
138. Id. at 811.
139. See note 105 supra (questioning economic risk criteria).
140. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 20, at 811.
141. SEC, INSTrruIoNAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, MR. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess.(1971) (cited in Fleischer, Mundheirn & Murphy, supra note 20, at
811-12).
142. With respect, however, to passing on information about a prospective
takeover effort to favored institutions, the persons who do so usually
are the persons who plan the takeovers and ordinarily have no rela-
tionship to the target company, nor do they usually have any fiduci-
ary duty to that company or its shareholders. This difference in
relationships does not necessarily mean that such passing on of in-
formation concerning takeovers should be permitted, but it may well
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of the problem. Can rule lOb-5 be legitimately expanded to reach
the market insider, presupposing of course that that is a desired
end, or is the problem better handled through other measures?
Perhaps "we have reached a point where corporate officials, share-
holders and potential investors, insiders and outsiders alike, are
entitled to more explicit language in the statute, the only ultimate
reflection of the democratic process of representative govern-
ment.,143
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision reached by the Second Circuit in Chiarella repre-
sents the latest judicial effort to define the scope of liability under
rule 10b-5. Unfortunately, the creation of a market insider duty of
disclosure appears before us like some a priori principle without
any clear indication that it is the next proper step in the evolution
of rule 10b-5. Indeed, the "treacherous moors" upon which market
participants tread have become more dangerous given the implica-
tions inherent in the parity of information notions of Chiarella.
John R. Hoffert '79
mean that if such activities are to be prohibited, this should be done
by a rule specifically directed to that situation rather than by an ex-
panded interpretation of Rule 10b-5 resting on a somewhat different
theory than that underlying that rule as to the obligations and duties
of those who receive material undisclosed information.
SEC, INsTrrI oNAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., summary vol. at xxxii (1971).
143. W. PAMrtEa, supra note 17, at 395 (footnote omitted).
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